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T he recent discovery of soy-bean rust in the UnitedStates has prompted many
agricultural pundits to predict
more corn acres will be planted in
the coming crop year. While soy-
bean rust may cause some shift
from soybeans to corn, producers
have already begun such a shift and
will likely continue regardless of
the presence of soybean rust. Fig-
ure 1 shows that Iowa soybean acre-
age reached its peak in 2001. Since
then, corn acreage has risen by
nearly 9 percent while soybean
acreage has declined by over 7 per-
cent. Three major factors explain
this shift: trend yields, variable
costs, and prices. If we look at these
factors over the past several years,
corn has outpaced or matched soy-
beans in all three areas. Corn trend
yields are growing relatively faster
than are soybean trend yields. Vari-
able costs of production for corn
are maintaining a consistent margin
with those for soybeans. Futures
prices for corn are relatively stron-
ger than are those for soybeans.
Figure 2 contains actual and
trend yields for Iowa corn and soy-
beans. Two trend lines are given for
each crop. One shows a 1980 to 1997
trend, which represents the informa-
tion that was available to farmers
before planting their crops in 1998.
The other shows the trend from 1980
to 2004, representing currently avail-
able information.
A comparison of the two sets of
trend yields demonstrates that
yields in the late 1990s and early
2000s have pushed the corn trend
higher, while the soybean trend re-
mains roughly the same. In 1998, the
corn trend yield was 129 bushels per
acre, 2.9 times the soybean trend
yield of 44 bushels per acre. In 2005,
the corn trend yield is 156 bushels
per acre, 3.4 times the soybean trend
yield of 46 bushels per acre. Given
corn’s growing advantage in trend
yields, for soybeans to be competi-
tive, soybean prices must be rela-
tively higher than corn prices or
soybean costs must be relatively
lower. Neither of these is turning out
to be the case.
FIGURE 1. CORN AND SOYBEAN PLANTED AREA IN IOWA
FIGURE 2. IOWA CORN AND SOYBEAN ACTUAL YIELDS AND YIELD TRENDS
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USDA has tracked agricultural
production costs for many years. The
upper section of Table 1 shows the
variable (or operating) costs for pro-
ducing corn and soybeans in the
Heartland region, which includes
Iowa. Cost figures after 2003 have not
yet been published. These figures
show corn variable costs are roughly
double the variable costs for soy-
beans. Going back to 1996, this cost
relationship has been fairly steady. So
variable costs have not moved in fa-
vor of either crop for quite some time.
The middle section of Table 1
shows the expected prices for the
crops before planting. For these
prices, we gathered the futures
prices in mid-January on the harvest
futures contracts for corn and soy-
beans. Looking at the ratio of the
corn and soybean prices, corn
reached its high point in 2002 when
its expected price was 53 percent of
the soybean price. Since then, the
price ratio has moved in soybeans’
favor—until this year. In 2005, the
ratio is 0.42, slightly below the 10-
year average. So current prices also
are not favoring either crop.
The bottom section of Table 1
shows the expected net returns for
each crop. The net returns are based
on the expected prices, trend yields,
and variable costs for each year. The
variable costs from 2003 are used for
2004-05. In each year, corn expected
net returns have exceeded soybean
expected net returns. This is a fair
comparison because lower fertilizer
costs from planting corn after soy-
beans are accounted for in USDA
cost figures. In fact, going back even
further, corn expected net returns
have surpassed soybean expected
net returns in 9 of the past 10 years.
Given that the expected net returns
are higher for corn, it is not surpris-
ing that Iowa farmers have been
shifting from soybeans to corn.
The additional threat of soybean
rust is not creating a new incentive
to move to corn but is actually just
reinforcing the shift. Soybean rust
could affect production and planting
decisions in several ways. First, if
FIGURE 3. SOYBEAN PRICES NEEDED TO HAVE EXPECTED NET RETURNS
EQUAL TO CORN
TABLE 1. VARIABLE COSTS, EXPECTED PRICES, AND EXPECTED NET RETURNS
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Variable Costs ($ per acre)
Corn 152.00 134.97 150.40
Soybeans 78.27 70.26 75.38
Expected Price ($ per bushel)
Corn 2.58 2.37 2.44 2.52 2.37
Soybeans 5.07 4.43 5.23 6.41 5.60
Expected Net Return ($ per acre)
Corn 226.40 218.03 218.59 236.43 218.81
Soybeans 146.16 127.57 160.22 215.89 181.27
Continued on page 9
soybean rust does spread during the
growing season, soybean producers
will face additional variable costs for
fungicides. Estimates of the addi-
tional costs range from $16 to $35
per acre, depending on the fungicide
used, the number of applications,
and the severity of the outbreak.
This will drive down soybean net
returns and make corn relatively
more attractive. Second, areas where
soybean rust is more likely to be
present may shift to alternative
crops. Given the biology of soybean
rust, southern states are more likely
to face rust problems. Corn, cotton,
and rice acreage in these areas may
increase and the additional produc-
tion from these acres would put
downward pressure on prices for
these crops. This change could also
spur higher soybean prices. These
price changes would support more
soybean acres in Iowa. The net effect
of soybean rust on expected net re-
turns is uncertain.
Figure 3 shows the soybean
prices that would be needed to
make corn and soybean expected
net returns comparable with and
without soybean rust. For the soy-
bean rust scenario, additional costs
of $25 per acre are assumed. Given
this additional cost, an extra 55¢ per
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bushel of soybeans would be needed
to offset the costs and maintain net
returns. With a corn price of $2.37
per bushel (the futures price for corn
on January 7) and assuming no soy-
bean rust problems, soybean prices
would need to move up to $6.42 per
bushel (82¢ higher than the soybean
futures price on January 7) to match
expected net returns with corn. With
soybean rust, soybean prices would
need to increase to nearly $7 per
bushel. Of course, $7 soybeans are
quite possible if rust significantly
reduces yields or causes major acre-
age shifts out of soybeans and into
corn. But, at least so far, the futures
market is discounting the possibility
of either event happening. ◆
2004. Canada has been out of the
Japanese market since May 2003 be-
cause of BSE, but the Canadian
cattle identification system will be a
cornerstone of Canada’s efforts to
reenter the Japanese market.
Both Canada and the USDA be-
lieve effective firewalls are in place
to ensure cattle suspected of hav-
ing BSE are removed from the North
American herd and kept from enter-
ing the food system. The United
States has named Canada a “mini-
mum-risk region,” which means the
Canadian industry meets risk stan-
dards that (a) prohibit specified risk
materials in human food; (b) imple-
ment a ruminant-to-ruminant feed
ban; (c) restrict imports to minimize
exposure to BSE; (d) use surveil-
lance procedures that meet or ex-
ceed international guidelines; and
(e) use epidemiological investiga-
tions, risk assessment, and risk miti-
gation measures.
Canada’s third case of BSE cre-
ated renewed concern in the U.S.
beef industry, with some groups urg-
ing the U.S. government to keep the
border closed to live cattle. How-
ever, both countries had acknowl-
edged the possibility of additional
cases, and the United States is pro-
ceeding with its decision to allow
imports of live cattle under 30
months of age and other specified
animals and products from Canada.
On March 7, 2005, the United States
and Canada will once again become
a North American market.
Based on the importance Japan
places on documented age verifica-
tion and Canada’s adoption of a na-
tional identification system, opening
the U.S. border to live Canadian
cattle should not slow U.S. efforts to
reenter the Japanese import market.
On the other hand, additional nego-
tiations will be required to compen-
sate for the U.S. industry’s slow
uptake of animal identification, age
verification, and traceability systems.
Further, being banned from the U.S.
market forced Canada to increase
slaughter capacity. This means the
Canadians will have more beef to sell
and can market their source-identi-
fied product as being distinctly differ-
ent from most U.S. beef.
Of greater concern than opening
the border is that, once access is
granted, exporters are likely to face
consumer resistance to U.S. beef. Con-
sumer polls indicate that between
two-thirds and three-fourths of Japa-
nese consumers say they will not buy
U.S. beef when it becomes available.
Given this consumer attitude, mar-
kets for less-expensive cuts of U.S.
beef will exist in food service outlets
where source identification is not
required. However, convincing con-
sumers to purchase more-expensive
cuts from retail outlets that require
country-of-origin labeling and from
restaurants that provide source iden-
tification will be a much harder sell.
Experience has given the Japa-
nese government a strong incentive
to respond to consumer concerns.
Traceability of livestock and other
food products is a high priority in Ja-
pan, and supermarkets and other
food suppliers have been quick to
embrace traceability as part of con-
sumer assurance programs. The in-
tent of the U.S. NAIS is to allow for
rapid tracking of animals in case of
disease outbreaks. However, because
the system would provide both docu-
mentation of age and traceability
from birth to the doors of the slaugh-
ter plant, adoption of the system
would be a major step forward in sat-
isfying Japanese concerns about ani-
mal identification and traceability
and perhaps in avoiding extended
import bans in the event of future ani-
mal disease or meat safety issues. ◆
Compared with many
other countries,
the United States has
been slow to adopt
a system that would
provide age
verification of all cattle.
